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The Path Dependent Nature of Factionalism in Post-
Khomeini Iran  
 
 
 
 
Dr Ariabarzan Mohammadi 
 
Abstract 
 
The main claim of this paper is that the anti-party system in Iran, or what is known as 
factionalism, is subject to a path dependent process. The political system in post-
Khomeini Iran is not based on political parties. The authoritarian regime in Iran has 
not developed into a ruling party system as in Egypt under Mubarak. Instead, through 
its different stages of institutionalisation, the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) has 
gradually degenerated from what looked like a single party system during the 
ascendancy of the Islamic Republic Party (IRP) in the first and second Majlis (the 
Islamic Consultative Assembly of Iran), to an anti-party, factional system that has 
continued to the present. My contention is that the institutionalisation of a ‘factional 
system’ in Iran is subject to ‘path dependency’ and consequently difficult to undo due 
to a self-reinforcing feedback loop which is in place and because of the considerable 
amount of money, as well as other resources, invested on the path of factionalism over 
an extended period of time.   
 
Introduction 
 
This paper contends that contingent events on the eve of the revolution and some 
choices made by IRI leaders in the infancy of the state set a convention (path 
dependence) which, after a while, became hard to break, not because of dogma or the 
conservativeness of the leaders per se, but because those events and policies triggered 
a self-reinforcing dynamic that led to a long-lasting ‘inertia’1 in the system. Although 
most of the substantial literature on post-Khomeini Iran deals with the notion of 
factionalism in the IRI,
2
 an institutionalist approach to the problem of factionalism in 
4 | P a g e  
 
 
 
Iran has yet to receive the attention it deserves. The literature on factionalism focuses 
predominantly on descriptive accounts of the views and affiliations of the factions, the 
growing conflict between traditional and modern forces, analysis of parliamentary 
politics and struggles over the definition (as well as control) of the state between 
proponents of religious values, populist principles, and revolutionary doctrine. 
Whereas this literature informs my project, it is insufficient in explaining why the 
ideological conflicts within the IRI have taken the shape of factional conflicts rather 
than party conflicts. Moreover, this literature does not consider institutionalist 
perspectives, including path dependency, as a way to understand the persistence of 
factionalism in Iran. Most general approaches to understanding institutions treat the 
origins, persistence and demise of institutions as being derived from a single causal 
process. Path dependence perspectives, by contrast, emphasise some contingency at 
the genesis of an institution and suggest that “factors responsible for the reproduction 
of an institution may be quite different from those that account for the existence of the 
institution in the first place”.3 In the context of the Islamic Republic, factors 
contributing to the genesis of factionalism appear to be different from those that 
explain the reproduction of the system. 
 
To address the shortfall of research on this important subject, this study adopts an 
analytical framework which uses Mahoney’s (2000)4 and Pierson’s (2004)5 
contributions to institutional analysis, grounded in an historical, path dependent 
methodology, as a starting point to analyse the trajectory of IRI history. In so doing, it 
investigates whether the anti-party system in Iran, or what is known as factionalism, is 
subject to a path dependent process. To study the instances and/or possibilities of 
change in the factional system that would not require institutional breakdown, this 
project will draw on Thelen’s (2003)6 work on path dependency theory. Furthermore, 
it examines the various aspects of factionalism in post-Khomeini Iran by drawing on a 
number of research streams such as work by Keshavarzian (2005)
7
, Moslem (2002)
8
, 
Bakhtiari (1996)
9
 and Alamdari (2005).
10
 
 
Path Dependency 
 
‘Path dependency’ (Mahoney 2000; Pierson 2004)11 holds that institutions become 
increasingly dependent on the paths chosen during the ‘critical junctures’ of their 
institutionalisation history. The path that has been chosen at a critical juncture from 
among other possible alternatives will be difficult to undo (long lasting ‘inertia’ in the 
system) if a self-reinforcing ‘positive feedback’ loop is in place and if a considerable 
amount of money and other resources are invested on the path over an extended 
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period of time. As a result, the institution becomes less dependent on human agency 
and more suggestive of ‘autopilot’ status. The longer the process is in place, the more 
complicated the reversing operation becomes.
12
  
 
Critical Junctures 
 
Critical junctures, as Pierson explains, “are brief moments in which opportunities for 
major institutional reforms appear, followed by long stretches of institutional 
stability.”13 They are those historical windows during which opportunities for new 
institutional arrangements become available, albeit for a limited time only. Path 
dependent processes begin by adopting a particular institutional arrangement from 
among two or more available alternatives present at these moments. As James 
Mahoney points out, “These junctures are ‘critical’ because once a particular option is 
selected it becomes progressively more difficult to return to the initial point when 
multiple alternatives were still available”.14 
 
Critical junctures correspond with periods of institutional genesis
 
and the selection 
process during critical junctures is specified by contingency.
15
 However, to argue that 
an event is contingent is not to suggest that it is random or without previous causes. 
What is meant by contingency in the path dependent context is that the factors 
responsible for the genesis of an institution may be quite different from those that 
account for the reproduction of the institution. As Mahoney insinuates, contingent 
events include “both small events that are too specific to be accommodated by 
prevailing social theories, such as the assassination of a political leader or the specific 
choices and ‘agency’ of particular individuals, and large, seemingly random processes 
such as natural disasters or sudden market fluctuation”.16 
 
Positive Feedback 
 
‘Positive feedback’ (or ‘self-reinforcement sequences’)17 in institutions is another 
characteristic feature of path dependent processes. Positive feedback, or as economists 
call it ‘increasing returns’, explains institutional persistence in path dependent 
patterns. In Mahoney’s words, “[w]ith increasing returns, an institutional pattern, once 
adopted delivers increasing benefits with its continued adoption, and thus over time it 
becomes more and more difficult to transform the pattern or select previously 
available options, even if these alternative options would have been more 
‘efficient’”.18 An option selected during a critical juncture may result in a path 
dependent institutional pattern if a positive feedback loop is established generating 
6 | P a g e  
 
 
 
increasing benefits which feed back into the institution as a benefactor, which in turn 
reinforces the favoured option.   
 
Positive feedback dynamics capture two key elements central to most analysts’ 
intuitive sense of path dependence. First, they clearly reveal how the costs of 
switching from one alternative to another will, in certain social contexts, increase 
markedly over time. Second, and related, they draw attention to issues of timing 
and sequence, distinguishing formative moments or conjunctures from the 
periods that reinforce divergent paths. In a process involving positive feedback, it 
is not just a question of what happens, but of when it happens. Issues of 
temporality are at the heart of the analysis.
19
 
 
For instance, it could be argued that the contingent events which occurred in the first 
two years after the revolution, such as the assassination of IRP leaders, put the 
country on the path of factionalism, which could have been altered with fewer costs at 
the beginning of those processes than at a later stage when more resources had been 
invested and positive feedback processes had been initiated. Changing the course of 
factionalism at such a late stage would be very difficult, unless another critical 
juncture were to arise at some point. 
 
Timing and Sequence (Temporality) in Path Dependent Patterns 
 
In historical institutionalisation, what happens, when, and in what order, are of utmost 
importance. As Paul Pierson notes, in a path dependent pattern “earlier parts of a 
sequence matter much more than later parts, an event that happens ‘too late’ may have 
no effect, although it might have been of great consequence if the timing had been 
different”.20 The order of things is vitally significant in path dependent patterns. A 
major contingent event happening too early or too late might not contribute to the 
emergence of a path dependent pattern at all. This could be proven by considering an 
alternative sequence of events and then imagining whether a completely different set 
of outcomes were possible.
21
 According to the cookery analogy adopted by Pierson,
22
 
if the critical junctures make the ingredients of the path dependency dish, the timing 
and sequence are the order of things in the recipe. An ingredient added too early or 
too late in the cooking process may result in a vastly different cuisine. Therefore, as 
Pierson puts it, “The analysis of temporal ordering is central to the claim that ‘history 
matters’, but this claim will be more convincing and will provide a better foundation 
for cumulative research if analysts focus more explicitly on where, when and how 
causally significant sequences come into play”.23 By the same token, in the context of 
this study, a historical narrative of major developments in the IRI will help us better 
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understand where, when and how the causally significant events have influenced the 
course of factionalism in Iran.  
 
Pierson’s summary of ‘path dependency’ in politics is quoted below: 
 
To summarise briefly, in settings where self-reinforcing processes are at work 
political life is likely to be marked by four features:  
 
1. Multiple equilibria. Under a set of initial conditions conducive to positive 
feedback, a range of outcomes is generally possible.  
 
2. Contingency. Relatively small events, if occurring at the right moment, can 
have large and enduring consequences.  
 
3. A critical role for timing and sequencing. In these path-dependent processes, 
when an event occurs may be crucial. Because early parts of a sequence matter 
much more than later parts, an event that happens “too late” may have no effect 
although it might have been of great consequence if the timing had been 
different.  
 
4. Inertia. Once such a process has been established, positive feedback will 
generally lead to a single equilibrium. This equilibrium will in turn be resistant to 
change.
24
 
 
Path dependency’s main claim is that, once solidified, institutions will have a life of 
their own that is somehow independent from the actors’ short-term aims and 
deliberations.  
 
The Context 
 
The first Majlis (1980-84): The era of the single party system  
 
Although there were many irregularities in the first parliamentary election after the 
revolution, to this date the first Majlis remains the most pluralistic parliament in the 
history of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In this election the Grand Coalition that was 
sanctioned by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and comprised the Islamic Republic 
Party and its satellite cabals won a relative majority with 83 out of a total 270; 115 
MPs claimed to be non-partisan but most of them later joined the Khomeinists. 
President Abolhassan Banisadr’s supporters obtained 33 seats whereas the Liberation 
Movement of Iran (LMI) won only 20 seats.
25
 
 
As the first parliament after the revolution, the first Majlis was never able to assume a 
normal legislative mandate; it had to respond to grave issues such as armed opposition 
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groups, the Iran-Iraq war, the hostage crisis and last but not least the conflict between 
President Banisadr and the IRP. On 21 June 1981, President Banisadr was impeached 
by the first Majlis, accused of an act of conspiracy against the regime. He was later 
removed by Khomeini and political power became consolidated in the hands of the 
Khomeinists. On 28 June 1981, a bomb took the life of Ayatollah Mohammad 
Hossein Beheshti (the founding father of the IRP) along with more than 70 members 
of his party. On 24 July, Mohammad Ali Rajaei was elected the President of Iran. 
Shortly after he assumed office he was assassinated, together with his Prime Minister, 
Hojatoleslam Mohammad Javad Bahonar (the IRP’s second director general). Ali 
Khamenei, the IRP’s third director general, was elected President on 13 October 1981. 
Khamenei’s first choice for Prime Minister was rejected by the Majlis. Subsequently, 
he put forward Mir-Hossein Mousavi as a compromise candidate. Mousavi’s 
nomination was narrowly approved by the Majlis on 31 October 1981. 
 
By 1983, the very last lingering opposition groups such as the Tudeh Party (Party of 
the Masses of Iran) had been crushed and their offices closed down. With no 
opposition party left to challenge their rule, members of the IRP felt safe enough to 
publicly express some of their own intra-party factional differences. Gradually, the 
victorious IRP elites who felt no threat from the ghir-e khodiha (outsiders), started to 
turn against each other but not in the same vicious manner that they had dealt with 
‘outsider’ opposition. The party’s left wing, known for their dynamic (flexible) 
interpretation of Shia fiqh (jurisprudence) and radical state-socialist policies, came to 
conflict with members of the right wing of the party who were in favour of the 
traditional Shia fiqh and keen on protecting the interests of bazaaris. The left wing 
(Maktabi) faction’s endorsement of the dynamic fiqh was in fact a tactic to give 
Khomeini an open hand in issuing unorthodox religious rulings that justified state 
intervention in every aspect of public life, from the economy to culture to politics. 
The right wing, or the conservatives, although generally supporting the idea of an 
authoritative Islamic state, did not want state intervention in the economy to include 
the areas traditionally controlled by the bazaar.  
 
These internal disputes are partly to blame for the later dissolution of the party.
26
 
However, it must be noted that these internal conflicts were not deemed to be of 
sufficient magnitude to outweigh the need for ruling party machinery; even if we 
accept that intra-party conflict alone caused the termination of the IRP, this supposed 
conclusion cannot answer the more important question of why the conflict did not 
result in dividing the IRP into smaller parties instead of abandoning the party model 
altogether and adopting a factional system. Abandoning the party system in the IRI 
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came as a result of a confluence of a number of trajectories and contingent events 
which is dealt with in the following sections.    
 
The second Majlis (1984-1988): The end of the party era 
 
By the time the second Majlis was convened, nearly all opposition groups were illegal 
and underground; yet, ironically, the demise of these competitors marked the 
beginning of the end for the IRP itself. The rivalry between the Maktabi and the 
conservative wings of the party was reflected in the Majlis. President Khamenei, 
Ayatollah Azari-Qomi and the Motalefeh bloc were advocates of the traditional or 
sonati school of jurisprudence, which was in congruence with their economic policies, 
whereas Prime Minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi and many of the younger IRP MPs 
endorsed what was known as the pouya or dynamic school of jurisprudence and were 
committed to protecting the interests of the poorer sectors of society through the state-
controlled economy. The Speaker of the Majlis, Hashemi Rafsanjani, despite being a 
conservative figure, managed to establish himself as a mediator between the two 
factions.   
 
Khomeini constantly shifted his position between the two factions to establish some 
kind of balance between his two blocs of followers and to keep the system 
functioning. However, it was no secret that his personal inclination was towards the 
Maktabi faction. This left the conservatives in a humiliating situation since none of 
them wanted to be marred by the accusation of not following the ‘Imam’s line’. Yet, 
what was most appalling for President Khamenei and his conservative allies was the 
fact that the president’s role was reduced to that of overseeing foreign affairs, with 
some very limited domestic responsibilities. It was difficult for the pro-Khomeini 
clerics (who, during Banisadr’s term in office, strongly advocated an interpretation of 
the IRI’s constitution that gave most executive responsibilities to the prime minister) 
to make a U-turn when one of their own was elected president. Therefore, Khamenei 
was left with limited input in choosing the cabinet ministers. 
 
With regard to the IRP, the intra-party conflict reached its peak in 1985 when 
Khamenei, who was elected president for the second time, strongly opposed Mir-
Hossein Mousavi’s nomination for the office of prime minister. IRP-affiliated MPs 
were divided over who to support as the next prime minister and a stalemate was 
created. Finally, Ayatollah Khomeini intervened in favour of Mousavi and Ali 
Khamenei had no choice but to obey the command of the Supreme Leader. However, 
this intervention and Khamenei’s dissatisfaction with the Imam’s decision left an open 
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wound in the party that has never been healed. The damage this incident caused to the 
already shattered party was fatal. In 1987, Khamenei and Hashemi Rafsanjani 
convinced Ayatollah Khomeini to wind down all of the IRP’s activities. 
 
The dissolution of the IRP could be seen as a critical juncture, arising out of the 
conjunction of a causally-linked trajectory and a number of contingent events 
including the assassination of two IRP Directors General. The trajectory started with 
the revolution’s period of euphoria, during which numerous political parties, groups 
and societies emerged. This was followed by a reign of terror that resulted in the 
ousting of all non-Khomeinist parties and then by a brief era of single-party rule and 
the emergence of intra-party rivalry in the IRP. The IRP was dissolved mainly 
because of the leadership vacuum caused by the assassinations of its ‘charismatic’ 
founder Ayatollah Beheshti and, shortly after, his successor Hojjatolesalm Bahonar. 
In the absence of these strong figures, the factional dispute in the party grew to the 
extent that Hojjatolesalm Khamenei, the third and last IRP Director General, pleaded 
with Ayatollah Khomeini for the termination of the organisation and the party was 
consequently dissolved. It could be argued that Ayatollah Beheshti’s assassination 
was an important contingent event, a critical juncture, during which a particular 
option (factional system) was selected. With increasing benefits, as we explain in this 
paper, a self-reinforcing feedback loop was created which has repeatedly strengthened 
this option (factionalism) and has eventually led to the institutionalisation of a 
factional system instead of a multi-party system or single-party rule in Iran. In support 
of the claim that the assassination of Ayatollah Beheshti was a critical juncture, we 
can imagine a scenario under which the selection of an alternative option at that time 
would have resulted in a dramatically different final outcome.   
 
The third Majlis (1988-1992): The departure of Khomeini and the positive feedback 
of factionalism   
 
Although in 1988 the Maktabis won a majority in the legislative body, by the end of 
its term they had lost the political battle to the conservatives. The war with Iraq was 
taking its toll on Prime Minister Mousavi: supplies of food and goods were rationed; 
Iraq’s missiles and chemical weapons inspired panic in Tehran and on the battlefields 
and the naval clash between Iranian and American forces had destroyed half of the 
IRI’s naval power. The public support for the ‘sacred defence’ was diminishing and 
with it the popularity of the Maktabis as well. On 16 November 1987, Ayatollah 
Montazeri, the spiritual father of the Maktabis who had been the strongest critic of the 
conservatives, was removed from his post as successor to the Leader after he 
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criticised Ayatollah Khomeini for his alleged role in the controversial trials that 
sentenced hundreds of political prisoners to death. The post of vice-regent was later 
eliminated under Iran’s revised constitution. However, the preparation for Montazeri’s 
isolation had been ongoing since 1986, when individuals close to Montazeri disclosed 
the top-secret Iran-Contra affair.
27
 Subsequently, a triangle consisting of Ahmad 
Khomeini, President Khamenei and Hashemi Rafsanjani worked tirelessly to drive out 
Montazeri from his position as successor and convince Khomeini to change the 
constitution by eliminating the post of prime minister, increasing the powers of the 
Leader and the president at the expense of the Majlis. In April 1989, a month before 
his death, Khomeini issued a decree convening the Assembly of Revising the 
Constitution. The assembly’s amendments dropped the requirement of marja’yat for 
becoming Leader, gave greater authority to the supreme jurisprudent (Article 57), 
eliminated the position of prime minister and legalised the status of the Expediency 
Council.  
 
Khomeini’s death in June 1989 fell like a thunderbolt on the Maktabi faction, 
depriving them of their greatest patron. Khomeini’s successor, Khamenei, was a 
prominent ideologue of the conservative faction. Unsurprisingly, he broke away from 
Khomeini’s tradition of maintaining a balance between the two factions and started 
visibly to side with the conservative faction. In addition, he publicly supported 
Hashemi Rafsanjani’s bid for presidency, which meant that the executive branch was 
falling into the hands of the conservatives. Rafsanjani’s election as President in 
August 1989 was not the end of the misery for the Maktabis. The worst was yet to 
come; he had advocated an interpretation of article 99 that gave the Guardian Council 
an open hand in disqualifying certain candidates for Majlis elections. With the 
Leadership, the Presidency and the Guardian Council in conservative control, the 
Maktabis were soon to be excluded from the centres of political power.
28
  
 
The fourth Majlis election (1992) was held while many prominent Maktabis were 
barred from standing by the Guardian Council. The conservatives won the majority 
with about 50% of the seats and the once powerful Maktabi faction was reduced to a 
small minority of around 40 MPs.
29
 By the end of the fourth Majlis, the title maktabis 
became less common to describe the radicals of the Majlis. The IRP held the majority 
and the Maktabi MPs represented there were a faction within the IRP. After the 
dissolution of the IRP, however, the opposition in the Majlis now comprised both 
those who did not have any IRP background as well as the former IRP members from 
the Maktabi faction. Therefore, the press simply chose the name ‘left-current’ to refer 
to the loyal opposition. The former Maktabis who were now part of the left-current 
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lost the fourth Majlis election for several reasons. First, many of their candidates were 
disqualified by the Guardian Council. Second, a number of their prominent figures 
were discredited by the conservatives’ negative campaigning. Third, they had lost 
much of their popularity because people no longer supported their restricted cultural 
views and their confrontational behaviour with regard to the private sector. Fourth, 
President Hashemi Rafsanjani’s promises of post-war reconstruction, rapprochement 
with the West and economic liberalisation had won the hearts and minds of the 
middle-class electorate. Therefore, many silent middle-class Iranians who refrained 
from voting in the previous elections for the reason that they found no programme 
that met their expectations decided to vote for President Rafsanjani’s supporters (i.e. 
the conservatives) in the hope that a pro-Rafsanjani Majlis would help the president 
implement his plans.  
 
By 1992 the left-current (formerly known as Maktabis) were pushed to the outer 
edges of the IRI’s political scene. They were first expelled from the judiciary and then 
squeezed out of other offices such as the Assembly of Experts. Eventually, the 
conservatives were able to seize the legislature after many of the left-current MPs in 
the third Majlis (1988-92) were disqualified from standing for the fourth Majlis.
30
 
However, the regime did not go as far as to suffocate the left-current and eliminate 
them from the political scene altogether. The Presidential Centre for Strategic 
Research (PCSR) was one of the important sanctuaries where the left-current elites 
would congregate and had a chance to flourish intellectually and endure financially. 
This centre was established by Rafsanjani in 1992 to facilitate political reforms in 
accordance with his economic adjustment programme. A board of directors ran the 
centre and its inaugural manager was the left-current’s godfather Hojjatoleslam 
Mohammad Mousavi Khoeiniha. The centre’s most influential personalities, who 
were actively pursuing the project of political reform, were Sa’id Hajjarian, Alireza 
Alavi-Tabar, Abbas Abdi and Majid Mohammadi, all of whom belonged to the left-
current faction.
31
 For these conquered but not destroyed leftist elites the above-
mentioned venue acted as an intellectual academy for interaction and contemplation. 
This unwanted banishment provided them with an opportunity for self-criticism and 
self-reflection. In addition, most of these people decided to use their free time to 
continue their studies in human sciences. During these years of academic education 
and intellectual deliberation, the previously-labelled radicals in the Iranian political 
spectrum modified their views and, little by little, went from zealous defenders of 
state socialism to advocates of democracy and personal liberties and became known 
as reformists. 
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Khomeini’s contingent death pushed the left-current faction out of the government. 
This important development could have worked as a catalyst to force the left-current 
into forming an opposition party in order to maximise their chances of survival 
outside the parliament and to utilise their political power. However, instead of 
establishing an opposition party the left-current resumed operating as a faction within 
the IRI’s factional system. One factor that could have played an important role in 
discouraging the left-current from forming a party was the fact that at that time party 
politics as a concept had lost its legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of many in Iran; 
after the troublesome experience of the party system in the beginning of the 
revolution, the credibility of political parties came under question by IRI leaders and 
the masses that supported them; parties were regarded as unnecessary organs that 
divided the nation and created conflict. Having said that, had it not been for 
Rafsanjani’s decision to co-opt the left-current and include them in such parallel 
organisations as the PCSR, the launch of a left-current political party was a move that 
the left-current might have made. However, given the negative view of parties held by 
many Iranians at the time, the success and endurance of such party would have been 
highly uncertain. The case mentioned above is an example of a positive feedback 
process that has reinforced the factional system adopted after the dissolution of the 
IRP. With its enduring adoption, the factional system delivers positive feedback 
(increasing benefits) for those who abide by its rules; thus, the costs of switching to an 
alternative (party) system increase over time and it becomes more and more difficult 
to transform the factional pattern. 
 
The fourth Majlis (1992-1994): Kargozaran – a faction in party’s clothing 
 
Rafsanjani’s cabinet was dominated by technocrats who held impressive university 
degrees but few revolutionary credentials. While introducing his cabinet to the third 
Majlis, in response to those who criticised the absence of prominent politicians in his 
team, President Rafsanjani stated, “I myself am political as much as you need… in the 
era of reconstruction we need a government of hard work”.32 Foreign borrowing and 
increased public spending were at the heart of Rafsanjani’s economic plans. In his 
domestic policies the President pursued selective economic liberalisation and limited 
socio-cultural reforms. With regard to foreign policy, Rafsanjani sought to normalise 
relations with the West; he tried to distance himself from the revolutionary rhetoric of 
the previous administrations, focusing instead on a pragmatic approach in foreign 
affairs. 
 
14 | P a g e  
 
 
 
In the first months of the new Majlis it appeared that Rafsanjani had the full backing 
of the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and the Speaker of the Majlis, Ali-Akbar 
Nategh-Noori. However, it soon became clear that no one should ever take such 
alliances for granted. The conservative MPs, whose main slogan in the election was 
Eta‘at az rahbari, hemayat az hashemi (obeying the leadership, supporting Hashemi), 
started to work against the very person who had helped them get elected in the first 
place. Yet, in their opposition to Rafsanjani, the conservatives were very careful not 
to give the left-current any advantage. As the conservatives identified with the 
economic policies of the president, they concentrated their criticism of Rafsanjani on 
his partial socio-cultural reforms, especially those masterminded by the Minister of 
Culture, Seyyed Mohammad Khatami,
33
 whereas the left-current, who benefited from 
the relative opening up of society, focused its attack on the government’s economic 
policies.  
 
By the time of Rafsanjani’s second term in office, the combination of the president’s 
liberal economic policies, injection of liquidity into the market and excessive foreign 
borrowing when oil prices were decreasing had created an inflation rate of 50%.
34
 
This made him lose much of his popularity in the Majlis and MPs across the left-right 
political spectrum started to echo their constituents’ concerns about the soaring prices 
of basic commodities and services, as well as the rapidly increasing cost of living. 
Yet, for Rafsanjani, what was even more worrying than the conservatives’ change of 
tune was the fact that Ayatollah Khamenei started to side with the critics. Rafsanjani 
was re-elected as president in June 1993 with 63% of the votes cast. This was a sharp 
decrease from 1989 when he had received 94.5% of the votes. This made him appear 
weaker in front of the Majlis conservatives who began working together with 
Khamenei to limit his powers. Unable to rely on the conservative supporters of the 
Leader, he decided to organise his own technocrat supporters in a new formation 
named Kargozaran-e sazandegi (Executives of Construction).  
 
It is important to note that Kargozaran as an entity was formed in 1996, just a few 
months before the fifth Majlis election. However, it was not until 1999 that 
Kargozaran could secure a licence from the interior ministry to become officially 
recognised as a political party. Yet it lacked organisational capabilities; the so-called 
party was only active during election periods (introducing candidates and engaging in 
election campaigns). Once elections were over, there remained little sign of 
Kargozaran as an organisation. Although it carried the name of a party, it was in fact 
another faction added to the factional map of the IRI, thus reinforcing the adopted 
pattern of factionalism. 
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The fifth and sixth Majlis (1996-2004): Khatami’s presidency and the lost 
opportunity for party making  
 
Despite Kargozaran’s remarkable campaign, the conservatives retained their majority 
in the fifth Majlis. Yet, Kargozaran was able to put up an influential minority caucus 
and form an alliance with the left-current MPs in order to smooth the progress of 
Rafsanjani’s policies. The second year of the fifth Majlis coincided with the seventh 
IRI presidential election. According to the Iranian constitution, Rafsanjani could not 
serve more than two consecutive terms. At first, Kargozaran MPs tried to push 
forward a proposal for amending the constitution to allow Rafsanjani’s multiple 
elections. However, the Speaker of the Majlis, Hojatoleslam Nategh-Noori, who was a 
presidential hopeful himself, strongly opposed this plan and stated that “[w]e have 
more qualified people than Mr Rafsanjani to fill the post”.35 Kargozaran elites were 
running out of time and could not find a strong candidate to replace Rafsanjani as the 
next president. Thus, they ultimately decided to go for a consensual candidate with the 
left-current. The move was widely seen as a last-minute effort by Kargozaran and the 
left-current to emerge as a vibrant opposition capable of challenging the 
conservatives. However, neither the left-current-Kargozaran coalition, nor the 
conservatives, could have imagined that the former Minister of Culture, Sayyed 
Mohammad Khatami would become the Islamic Republic’s seventh president. His 
victory was particularly notable because the establishment’s preferred candidate was 
the fifth Speaker of the Majlis, the leader of the conservative camp, the de facto leader 
of the Combatant Clergy Association (CCA) and the former interior minister, 
Hojjatoleslam Ali Akbar Nategh-Noori, who reportedly enjoyed the endorsement of 
the IRI’s Leader, Ali Khamenei.36 
 
In the course of the 1990s, the left-current went through an ideological revolution and 
many of the political current’s once radical elites abandoned, or at least softened, the 
edges of their radical positions regarding support for state-controlled economy and 
anti-American dogma. This is why, at the critical juncture of 1997, the left was 
ideologically ready to forge an alliance with the modern conservatives (i.e., 
Kargozaran) and was prepared to run a joint campaign for Khatami. On the other 
hand, Kargozaran entered the alliance for three main reasons: 
 
1. Kargozaran could not reach a similar deal with the traditional conservatives, 
mainly because the conservatives were confident of winning with or without 
help from the ‘modern right’ (Kargozaran’s title in the Iranian press).   
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2. Kargozaran MPs in the fifth Majlis failed to pave the way for another term of 
Rafsanjani’s presidency. It looked as if Kargozaran had entered the alliance 
with the left, including CCL, MIRO and students of the Office of Unity, to 
secure their posts in the post-Hashemi government.  
3. The technocrat elites of Kargozaran wanted to see a continuation of Hashemi 
Rafsanjani’s economic adjustment policies known as Ta’dil eghtesadi 
(economic adjustment).  
 
Khatami won the election on a platform that emphasised Jame’ie Madani – literally 
‘civil society’ – and a commitment to the rule of law and the constitution.37 It was 
clear that, for Khatami, the political opening of the Iranian system had precedence 
over its economic liberalisation, whereas Kargozaran’s priority was ‘Rafsanjani-
branded’ economic reform. It was evident that in order for the President to implement 
his political agenda a political organisation that was closer to his vision was needed; 
Kargozaran’s priority was economic liberalisation. The left-current’s traditional 
organisations such as the Association of Combatant Clerics and the Mojahedin of the 
Islamic Revolution Organisation (MIRO) lacked the organisational efficiency to act as 
vehicles for the implementation of Khatami’s agenda. Therefore, a number of 
Khatami’s supporters who contributed to the monthlies Kiyan and Aeen and were 
prominent in the Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution Organistion formed a 
‘reformist’ party, Hezb-e Jebheye Mosharekat-e Iran-e Eslami (the Islamic Iran 
Participation Front Party). Although formed in 1998 and still in its incipient stage, 
Mosharekat won the majority of Tehran city council seats in 1999 and the sixth Majlis 
seats in the 2000 elections. The rapid electoral success of Mosharekat coincided with 
five main developments within its environment:   
 
1. The reformists’ newspapers were successful in bringing nationwide attention 
to the significance of reformism, civil society and democracy.  
2. At the time of the sixth Majlis election, President Khatami was at the peak of 
his popularity. The fact that President Mohammad Khatami’s brother was the 
leader of Mosharekat helped the party gain more votes. 
3. The Interior Ministry – in charge of running the elections – was in the hands of 
the reformist cleric Mousavi-Lari. Therefore, it was not possible for the 
conservatives to use this organisation for their own benefit.  
4. As the conservative-dominated Guardian Council had not yet recovered from 
the shock of Khatami’s 1997 victory, they did not move to block reformist 
candidates.  
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5. The Guardian Council tried to suspend the announcement of results, hoping 
that the election would be called off, but after three months of uncertainty, 
Ayatollah Khamenei asked the Guardian Council to recognise the results.   
 
Altogether, the reformist candidates won about 200 seats from the total of 290 in the 
sixth Majlis. The share of the Mosharekat faction in the sixth Majlis reformist bloc 
was more than 120 MPs,
38
 although we have to keep in mind that many of those 
elected with Mosharekat’s backing, especially in the smaller cities, were not members 
of the party.
39
The reformist era was marked by a relative political development and a 
boom in party registration. In addition, considerable government financial assistance 
was directed towards political parties; in 2002, the first year of the funding 
programme, between 600 and 800 million tomans ($600,000-800,000) was distributed 
among more than 70 registered political parties.
40
 However, most of these parties 
existed only on paper. Just a few, such as Mosharekat, MIRO and Motalefeh had the 
minimum requirements for being a political party. The majority of these so-called 
parties were too loosely assembled to be called an organisation, let alone a political 
party. These ‘paper’ parties were acting as a banner under which short-term election-
time alliances were forged. The endurance of these paper parties was directly related 
to the life of the election alliance, which in most cases was very short. Despite the fact 
that much of the state funding was wasted on these paper parties, the subsidy that 
went to genuine parties such as Mosharekat further enhanced their position as an 
influential political organisation in the public office. However, state assistance comes 
with a price; when a party receives regular financial support from the state, it 
automatically becomes less reliant on grassroots financial contributions, thus losing 
interest in expanding its grassroots outreach.  
 
By the year 2000, nearly all Mosharekat Central Council members were engaged in 
state organisations, from city councils to the Majlis to the cabinet itself, thus leaving 
no one behind to take care of the institutionalisation of the party in the headquarters 
and at the grassroots level.
41
 As a result, little was achieved in terms of enhancing 
civil society, including party-building, despite being one of the main slogans of the 
reformist camp before the elections. The reformists were handicapped by the lack of 
nationwide organisation. This weakness was recognised by the conservatives who 
seized the opportunity by gathering their most steadfast elements inside and outside 
the Majlis in a formation later nicknamed Setade Zedde Eslahat or the Counter-
Reform Headquarter (CRH)
42
 to coordinate all efforts aimed at bringing the reformists 
to a standstill. This headquarter included Majlis deputies, such as Mohammad Reza 
Bahonar; high profile members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, such as 
18 | P a g e  
 
 
 
Major-General Rahim Safavi; high ranking officials from the Office of Supreme 
Leader like Sardar Vahid; powerful judges, such as Golam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejeie; 
and, last but not least, fundamentalist clerics, such as Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi. This 
new breed of conservatives chose the title Osoulgarayan (principalists) to distinguish 
themselves from the traditional conservatives who preferred a more cautious approach 
in dealing with the reformists. 
 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is thought to be the offshoot of the principalists. Many 
believe that his triumph in the 2005 presidential election was the product of more than 
six years of anti-reformist practice instructed by CRH leaders. Therefore, once in 
power, it was not surprising at all to see him reverse every advancement made during 
Khatami’s period in office. Many took the name ‘Osoulgarayan’ literally and thought 
that they sought a return to the principles and values of the Islamic revolution. 
Nonetheless, this was a narrow description of who they really were. The 
Ahmadinejad-type of principalists, or Ahmadinejadists, were comprised of a group of 
low-ranking conservatives who saw the opportunity offered by the CRH and seized it.  
The Ahmadinejad-type of principalists had three main features: 
  
1. They were low to middle rank laymen and clerics who established themselves 
on the regime’s periphery. They had spent more than two decades serving the 
conservative elites, waiting for the right moment to take on a leading role.  
2. Rather than embracing any strong ideology, the Ahmadinejadists were 
demagogues, many of whom seemed concerned with acquiring personal 
wealth and power. 
3. They did not share with the established conservative elites their sense of job 
security, which made it difficult for them to conceal their longing for power 
and wealth. Ahmadinejad’s close friend and advisor, Sadegh Mahsouli 
(Minister of Interior 2008-2009 and Minister of Welfare 2009-2011) is a 
classic example of this new type of Iranian politician. He was the first top IRI 
politician to admit openly that he was a billionaire. In November 2008, when 
questioned by the eighth Majlis about his wealth, Mahsouli replied “[m]y 
assets are worth about 160 billion tomans [about US$160 million at the time] 
most of which I made in recent years by developing old houses and then 
selling them”. He added, “[w]hat Imam Khomeini prohibited was the palace 
lifestyle and not the palace ownership, I am ready to spend all my wealth for 
the ideals of the revolution”.43  
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Ahmadinejad and his close circle strongly rejected the idea of party politics; they 
insisted that parties were Western products and, in an Islamic country, mosques 
function better than political parties. This was most obvious in the words of Hussein 
Saffar Harandi, the minister of culture and Islamic guidance, who maintained that 
“[i]n a country where party system was not a successful experiment, another 
organisation must protect the people; the clergy had so far accepted part of 
responsibility, the Basij has done its part. However, many are still outside these 
ranges.”44 Yet, not all conservatives agreed with such remarks. Indeed, many 
prominent ones, including Aliakbar Nategh-Nouri
45
 and Ali Laijani,
46
 started 
distancing themselves from the kind of anti-party doctrine that was expressed by 
people like Saffar Harandi and began to advocate political parties. Having said that, to 
this day these moderate conservatives have not become successful in bringing a 
change in Iran’s anti-party system.   
 
The seventh Majlis (2004-2008): Further reinforcement of the factional system  
 
In the final days of the sixth Majlis, the Guardian Council disqualified most reformist 
MPs from running for the seventh Majlis elections. In the absence of serious 
contenders, while the reformists were suppressed and their newspapers shut down, a 
coalition consisting of the principalists and traditional conservatives under the name 
E‘telaf-e Abadgaran-e Iran-e Eslami or the Islamic Iran Developers’ Coalition 
dominated for the seventh Majlis.
47
 The principalists tolerated the final year of 
Khatami’s presidency, as he did not constitute a threat to their increasing power. A 
presidential election was held in 2005 and, as in 1997, a surprise candidate won. Only 
this time the victorious candidate didn’t even touch on the political reform agenda; 
Ahmadinejad’s campaign pledges were based on his famous slogan of “bringing oil 
money to people’s tables”.48 In contrast, Dr Mostafa Moein, who was the top 
reformist candidate, did not pay enough attention to economic issues. He came fifth, 
while Mehdi Karroubi, who made the famous promise of giving $50 to every Iranian, 
came third in the race.  
 
After Ahmadinejad was elected in 2005, the assumption was that the 
principalist/conservative-dominated Majlis would be in total harmony with the 
principalist president. Yet, as in the case of Rafsanjani and the fourth Majlis, almost 
immediately after Ahmadinejad was sworn in as president, the seventh Majlis started 
challenging him. The first signs of confrontation appeared over Ahmadinejad’s 
proposed cabinet. Most of the 21 candidates that Ahmadinejad introduced to the 
Majlis were unknown even to the principalist MPs;
49
 therefore, the Majlis rejected 
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four of Ahmadinejad’s candidates and, in the case of the oil ministry, the president’s 
two following nominees were also rejected for lack of experience until finally his 
fourth choice, Mr Hamaneh, received the seal of approval. In the latter part of the 
seventh Majlis, the disagreements with the President reached a critical stage; the 
President’s rebuff of one of the Majlis legislations was viewed by the majority of the 
parliament as an utter disregard for the constitution. This forced the Speaker of the 
Majlis, Mr Hadad-Adel, to write a letter to Khamenei asking for his guidance. 
Khamenei’s answer was short but precise: “the legislations passed by the Majlis 
according to the legal procedure mentioned in the constitution are obligatory for all 
the branches”.50 However, Ahmadinejad continued his defiance by stating that he 
rejected those acts because they were unconstitutional.
51
   
 
Ahmadinejad appealed to the working class in his first term and tried to find a social 
base among them in his second. Nonetheless, he largely ignored the fact that without a 
strong political party his social base could not be mobilised effectively. Such a 
political party could have had a dramatic impact on the outcome of the Majlis 
elections. It could have institutionalised the president’s agenda and integrated all his 
supporters under its umbrella and even put up a credible challenge to the Supreme 
Leader. Ahmadinejad missed his chances for party-building. That said, even if he 
attempted to build a party, he was going to face strong resistance from the path 
dependent dynamics of an anti-party political system. 
 
The eighth Majlis (2008-2012): The Green Movement and the deficit of grassroots 
organisation 
 
In the 2007 city council election, Ahmadinejad loyalists decided to contest the 
election as a single entity under the name Rayehei-e Khosh-e Khedmat or the Pleasant 
Scent of Servitude. They were confident that Ahmadinejad’s popularity and the 
backing they received from his government’s apparatus would be sufficient to 
guarantee them an easy victory over other competing factions; thus, they felt no need 
to form an alliance with the other conservatives. Contrary to what they thought would 
be a landslide victory, their election performance was very poor. This bitter defeat 
made them revise their election tactics; ahead of the eighth Majlis election, 
Ahmadinejad loyalists negotiated a deal with the other principalists and conservatives 
to join a grand election alliance in return for an allocated number of seats. This 
election front was named Jebhe Mottahed-e Osoulgarayan (JMO) or the United Front 
of Principalists. In the eighth Majlis Ahmadinejad’s supporters won 60 seats, the other 
conservatives/principalists gained about 140 seats and the reformists’ share of MPs in 
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the parliament increased from 30 in the seventh Majlis to 60 in the eighth. A few 
months after the eighth Majlis was convened, Ahmadinejad suffered a blow when his 
interior minister, Ali Kordan was forced to resign after his ‘doctorate degree’ from 
Oxford University turned out to be faked.
52
 However, as the presidential election was 
approaching, the Majlis decided to postpone its rivalry with the president for a while.  
 
Iran’s tenth presidential election on 12 June 2009 saw the incumbent, President 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad face off against Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi and 
the secretary of the Expediency Council, Mohsen Rezaei. Millions of Iranians cast 
their votes in an extraordinarily cheerful atmosphere that was further heated by a 
number of television debates involving the four candidates. But, this initial festive 
mood was short lived and gave way to widespread resentment; in an exceptionally fast 
count of handwritten ballots, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was announced as the 
winner. Mir Hossein Mousavi rejected the results and urged backers to resist a 
government based on “lies and dictatorship”.53The day after the results were 
announced, Mousavi supporters took to the streets to call for a recount and were met 
with harsh security crackdowns. This was the start of months of mass protests, which 
came to be known as the Green Movement.  
 
Despite the initial speculations that the regime would surrender to public demands, the 
IRI regime intensified its repressive tactics, particularly the use of paramilitary forces 
against the demonstrators, imprisonment of Green Movement activists and the 
shutting down of reformist newspapers and parties. The regime was able to bring the 
protests to a halt mainly because: 
 
1. The middle-class, who were the backbone of the Green Movement, failed to 
build a broader network of support across different levels of society in Iran. 
2. When in government, the reformists did not pay the necessary attention to 
developing their grassroots. For the reformist parties of Mosharekat and 
MIRO, the main objective was to be present in public office (e.g. the Cabinet, 
Majlis, and city councils); thus, the countrywide expansion of the grassroots 
section of the party was largely neglected. During the events that followed the 
June 2009 election, the absence of a strong nationwide organisation that could 
reach every corner of the country, maintain the demonstrations and organise 
the masses to challenge the regime made it easier for the security apparatus of 
the IRI regime to bring the Green Movement to a standstill.  
3. The standard slogans adopted by the Green Movement such as ‘death to the 
dictator’, ‘neither Gaza, nor Lebanon, I give my life to Iran’ and 
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‘independence, freedom, the Iranian Republic’ exposed the wide gap between 
the discourse of the leaders of the Green Movement and the protesters’ 
discourse of liberty, nationalism and democracy. Mir-Hossein Mousavi’s 
persistence on remaining faithful to the ideals of Ayatollah Khomeini and his 
emphasis on the “Golden Age of Imam Khomeini”,54 meant that he did not 
understand the avant-garde character of the Green Movement. At the 
grassroots level the Green Movement supporters did not see so much 
difference between the Khomeini and the Khamenei eras; they wanted to break 
free from both and start a new era of democracy and freedom.    
4. The Iranian regime employed sophisticated and multi-layered tactics to curb 
the protests. For instance, in less than a month the regime arrested and 
detained most of the pro-Green Movement strategists (people like Saied 
Hajarian, Mohsen Mirdamadi, Behzad Nabavi, Mostafa Tajzadeh and 
Mohammad-Reza Tajik). Consequently, Mousavi and Karroubi were deprived 
of the counsel of their wise men; this added to their isolation, caused primarily 
by the de facto house arrest and made it very difficult for them to respond 
rapidly and calculatedly to the fast-changing developments on the ground.  
 
The regime was successful in crushing the demonstrations. However, the great price it 
had to pay for suppressing millions of pro-democracy Iranians was that it could no 
longer claim electoral/legal legitimacy. Ahmadinejad experimented with the idea that 
he could benefit from this weak spot and blackmail the system. Therefore, shortly 
after his presidency was ratified by Ayatollah Khamenei he appointed Esfandyar 
Rahim-Mashaei, a man who seriously challenged the authority of the senior clergy, as 
his vice president. What followed proved how wrong Ahmadinejad was in his 
assumptions. When behind-the-scenes talks could not convince Ahmadinejad to 
change his mind, Ayatollah Khamenei wrote a classified letter to the president asking 
him to remove Mashaei from the vice presidency, to which Ahmadinejad acted as if 
he had not seen the letter at all. Nevertheless, and to his surprise, Ayatollah Khamenei 
disclosed his classified letter to the public. Finally Rahim-Mashaei tendered his 
resignation to save his loyal friend the humiliation of having to discharge him. This 
was the start of a series of measures by Ayatollah Khamenei aimed at confining 
Ahmadinejad’s surprising tactics. Khamenei used the judiciary and the IRGC, in 
addition to his loyal MPs in the eighth Majlis, in order to control the president.  
 
The ninth Majlis: The consolidation of factionalism  
The first round of parliamentary elections for the ninth Majlis was held on 2 March 
2012 and a second round of voting took place on 4 May 2012 for the remaining 65 
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seats in the 290-seat Majlis. After the final results of Iran’s 2012 Majlis election were 
announced, many commentators and analysts concluded that President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad’s support in Iran’s Majlis had crumbled as the results showed rival 
principalists consolidating their hold on the legislative body. The faction that declared 
victory was a newly reshuffled front by the name of Jebhe Mottahed-e Osoulgarayan 
(JMO) or the United Front of Principalists, an alliance comprised of major pro-
Khamenei principalists/conservatives led by Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Mahdavi 
Kani, a prominent traditionalist conservative and chairman of the Assembly of 
Experts since 2011. The JMO was restored a few months before the election to foster 
unity among all principalists for the parliamentary election, a task it could not 
accomplish; a competing front led by Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi came second in the 
election. Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi is the spiritual leader of the second largest group in 
the Majlis, Jebhe Paydari Enghelab-e Eslami (JPEE) or the Steadfast Front of the 
Islamic Revolution. The front is comprised of a mixture of Ahmadinejad supporters 
and Mesbah loyalists and a number of ex-ministers and officials from the first 
Ahmadinejad administration. The JPEE refrained from joining the JMO, accusing it of 
remaining silent in the face of Fetnehgaran or seditionists – those who contested 
positions against Jebhe Towhid va Edalat (JTE) or the Monotheism and Justice Front, 
a front associated with Rahim-Mashaei, who is regarded by many conservatives as the 
leader of the ‘deviant current’ or Jaryan-e enherafi.55 Mashaei and his followers, 
labelled as the deviant current, are calling for, among other things, some degree of 
secularisation, disregard for the political role of the Shiite clergy and emphasis on the 
‘Iranian school of Islam’.56 Moreover, they are accused of claiming direct connection 
with the Shiites’ hidden Imam, Imam Mahdi. Such alleged ‘association’, by 
definition, overrides any need to take orders from Mahdi’s, namely Ayatollah 
Khamenei. In other words, those who claim to be connected to the hidden Imam do 
not need to take orders from Khamenei. It is worth mentioning that Rahim-Mashaei’s 
loyal group, the JTE, lost substantially in the election, ending up with only 17 out of 
the 290 seats in the Majlis. From the total of 290 elected members in the ninth Majlis, 
65 belong exclusively to the JMO list, 22 to JPEE, 61 members’ names were 
mentioned in both JMO and JPEE lists, 22 are reformists, 17 belong to the MJF and 
105 are supposedly independents.
57
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It is important to note that in each parliamentary election since the revolution, around 
half of the Majlis MPs have changed. It is interesting that the observations of Maurice 
Duverger, written many years ago, about countries with weakly-institutionalised party 
systems, correspond well to the case of the current Iran. 
 
In countries in which democracy has been newly implanted, in which parties 
have not yet taken strong roots, it is characteristic of elections that there are 
considerable variations from one ballot to the next, and this weakens the 
regime.
58 
 
 
Lack of stability and continuity in the Iranian legislative body is mainly due to the 
deficiencies of the institutionalised parties. Without strong parties and in the absence 
of an effective party whip system, it is difficult to discipline the opportunist elements 
of any given faction. During the seventh and eighth Majlises, Ahmadinejad’s 
ministers survived several interpolations mainly by promising ‘pork barrel’ spending 
to the opportunist MPs. Occasionally, when the Majlis stood firm against the 
president, a clear go-ahead signal by the office of the Leader was involved. Iran’s 
Majlis is not an autonomous legislative body, as the Guardian Council can veto bills 
passed by it. In addition, since the exclusion of the prominent reformists from 
elections in 2004, the parliament in Iran has lost much of its previous influence.  
 
Nowadays, the Majlis members do not possess the will or the power to challenge any 
decision made by the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. This was evident 
from the dispute over Ahmadinejad’s decision to dismiss the intelligence minister, 
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Hojatoleslam Heidar Moslehi. The majority of the pro-Ahmadinejad MPs decided to 
turn their back on their patron and back the Supreme Leader instead, perhaps because 
they realised that Ahmadinejad would only be president for a few years, whereas 
Khamenei is a lifelong Leader with greater authority than the president. In his turn, 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad played a double game with the Majlis. On the one hand, he 
tried to increase the number of MPs loyal to him in parliament; on the other, he 
exploited the fact that since 2004 the Majlis had lost much of its credibility as a 
representative institution. He mocked and ignored many Majlis legislations that he did 
not approve of. His administration reduced the number of pages in the annual budget 
plans from about 1,000 pages during Khatami’s period in office to the size of a small 
booklet. These shrunken proposals deliberately omitted many important details and 
allowed room for arbitrary interpretation by Ahmadinejad. To make matters even 
more complicated, the president usually procrastinated over the delivery of these 
already vague proposals, denying parliament the very time it needed to fully discuss 
the budget before putting it to the vote. President Ahmadinejad did not even take his 
interpolation seriously, which was a first in IRI history;
59
 his use of slang, jokes and 
proverbs during the questioning sessions infuriated many parliamentarians. Yet, the 
Majlis could not take the interpolation any further without the agreement of the 
Leader. Ayatollah Khamenei did not want the conflict between Ahmadinejad and the 
Majlis to spread into the public arena. The Leader’s ideal scenario was one in which 
he decided when it was time to face up to the President and to what degree. 
Obviously, Khamenei did not intend to be seen as the one pulling down the curtain on 
a president whose government he once praised as “the best from the Constitutional 
Revolution to date”.60   
 
Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi: Expanding his Powers 
 
Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi is a hardline Iranian cleric and politician 
who was widely seen as President Ahmadinejad’s spiritual advisor. Mesbah is also a 
member of the Assembly of Experts, the body responsible for choosing the Supreme 
Leader, where he heads a minority ultra-conservative faction. The Leader has a high 
regard for Mesbah and once compared him with the late Ayatollah Motahari 
(Ayatollah Khomeini’s brightest student and one of the influential leaders in the 
Islamic Revolution) who was assassinated in May 1979. Ayatollah Mesbah is also 
highly respected among IRGC commanders, many of whom regularly attend his 
speeches and sermons in Qom where he heads the Imam Khomeini Education and 
Research Institute, an institution with generous state funding that is in charge of 
training the future cadres of the regime. 
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Despite his prominent status as the spiritual leader of the ultra-conservatives, until 
recently Ayatollah Mesbah did not play a direct role in the partisan/factional politics 
of the Majlis. When Ahmadinejad was first elected president in 2005, the initial 
cordial affection between the two men made everyone believe that all of Mesbah’s 
objectives would be achieved by Ahmadinejad. However, the breach of trust that 
occurred between the two as a result of the president’s refusal to distance himself 
from Rahim-Mashaei convinced the ambitious Ayatollah to distance himself from 
Ahmadinejad and seek out a new political arrangement. The radical Ayatollah’s new 
scheme came in the form of establishing the JPEE, a political front that Mesbah hoped 
to be more reliable than the president. However, in 2013, when a serious dispute arose 
between the Isfahan and Tehran branches of the JPEE concerning whom to support as 
presidential candidate – Saeed Jalili or Bagher Lankarani – and Mesbah’s personal 
preference (Lankarani) was ultimately abandoned by the members of the faction, it 
became clear how shaky the organisation of the JPEE was. 
 
The Revolutionary Guards and the Ninth Majlis 
 
In the first days of the run-up to the election, the IRGC seemed puzzled as to what to 
do and whose side to take in the ninth legislative election. Nonetheless, when IRGC 
top commanders started defining the ‘criteria’ for regime loyalty, their position vis-à-
vis different factions became clearer. In an interview conducted by Fars News Agency 
in February 2012, a few weeks before the election, the deputy chairman of Iran’s Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, Brigadier General Massoud Jazayeri asserted that those who were 
silent in the face of the Fetneh (a code name for the Green Movement) and the 
members of the “deviant-current” did not have the credibility to enter the Majlis.61 
The expression “those who were silent in the face of the Fetneh” is sometimes used to 
describe members of the JMO and “the deviant-current” is a clear reference to the 
JTE. Thus, Jazayeri’s comments could be interpreted as the IRGC’s siding with the 
JPEE. 
 
Days after the ninth Majlis was convened, Ali Motahari, a principalist MP, son of the 
late Ayatollah Motahari and one of President Ahmadinejad’s most vocal critics, 
accused the IRGC of “openly endorsing their preferred candidates” in the election.62 
After Ali Motahari’s accusations against IRGC, the Guards were quick to reject his 
statements, warning that such allegations could be subject to prosecution.
63
 However, 
the way in which both the Speaker of the Majlis and the head of the judiciary reacted 
to the issue was noteworthy since they both tried to indicate that although the IRGC 
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did not systematically meddle in the election, there were nevertheless some levels of 
intervention by individual commanders. For example, the Speaker of the Majlis, Ali 
Larijani, addressing members of parliament on the event of Khoramshahr’s liberation 
commemoration, turned to the issue of  Motahari’s accusations against the IRGC and 
stated that,  
 
The esteemed colleagues while expressing their concerns must take into 
consideration the significance of the country’s institutions that are built by the 
blood of Hezbollahi combatants and act in a way so that the dignity of the 
Revolutionary Guards is preserved in the society. In addition they should respect 
the officials who are serving in the three branches. If the content of your speech 
involves criticism, in the current situation it is best to express it in a dignified 
manner.
64 
 
 
Correspondingly, the head of the judiciary and Ali Larijani’s brother, Ayatollah 
Sadegh Amoli Larijani, addressed the issue in a similar fashion, “If some within 
IRGC have committed a felony, it does not concern IRGC itself. The same goes for 
wrongdoings in the Majlis or the Judiciary”.65 In its turn, the absence of the IRGC 
commander-in-chief General Jafari at the opening ceremony of the ninth Majlis was 
broadly perceived as a sign of the Revolutionary Guards’ disappointment over the 
way in which the whole matter was dealt with by the Larijani brothers and a clear 
indication that the quarrel between the Guards and the Majlis was far from over. 
 
According to the Iranian constitution, the Revolutionary Guards are not allowed to 
interfere in politics or elections. Although their interference in the previous elections 
had been denounced by opposition and reformist groups, this was the first time that 
conservative figures in the Majlis confirmed it.
66
 The IRGC’s position in the power 
structure of the Islamic Republic is best explained in the following excerpt from the 
informed Rand publication. 
 
The IRGC’s presence is particularly powerful in Iran’s highly factionalised 
political system, in which the president, much of the cabinet, many members of 
parliament, and a range of other provincial and local administrators hail from the 
ranks of the IRGC. Outside the political realm, the IRGC oversees a robust 
apparatus of media resources, training activities, and education programs 
designed to bolster loyalty to the regime, prepare the citizenry for homeland 
defense, and burnish its own institutional credibility vis-à-vis other factional 
actors. It is in the economic sphere, however, that the IRGC has seen the greatest 
growth and diversification—strategic industries and commercial services ranging 
from dam and pipeline construction to automobile manufacturing and laser eye 
surgery have fallen under its sway, along with a number of illicit smuggling and 
black-market enterprises.
67
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It is important to note that the IRGC is not operating like a military junta; instead, it 
uses the factional system in order to participate in the political process, thus further 
reinforcing the factional system even further. 
 
The 2013 Presidential Election 
 
In the months preceding the 2013 presidential election, the marginalised reformists 
who were desperate to come back into mainstream Iranian politics launched a 
campaign pleading with Khatami to nominate himself for the presidency. The former 
president refused to run and announced his support for Rafsanjani. However, the 
Guardian Council barred Rafsanjani from entering the election, thus disappointing 
many Iranians who saw in him a saviour who could extricate Iran from its economic 
difficulties. The reformist camp was not alone in receiving a hurtful blow from the 
Guardian Council; Ahmadinejad’s Putin/Medvedev style plan for a power grab was 
shattered after the Guardian Council disqualified the President’s protégé, Esfandyar 
Rahim Mashaie.  
 
In the absence of strong contenders from either the reformists or the ‘deviant current’, 
the principalist/conservative candidates perceived the 2013 election as an in-house 
competition among the larger principalist/conservative family. With Tehran mayor 
Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf representing the modern principalists, Saeed Jalili then 
chief nuclear negotiator, Hadad-Adel the former Speaker of the Majlis representing 
the hardliners and the former foreign minister, Ali Akbar Velayati the conservatives’ 
candidate, the election setting seemed to provide the voters with enough options to 
choose from, yet to keep the office of president in the principalists’ hands. The two 
remaining pro-reform candidates, Mohammad Reza Aref and Hassan Rouhani, were 
never thought to pose a serious challenge to the top principalist contenders; they were 
second-rate pro-reform candidates who did not yet have the consensus of the reformist 
camp. Nevertheless, a series of events took place in the run-up to the election that 
proved all predictions wrong and ended in the victory of Hassan Rouhani, who 
became president in the first round with more than 18 million votes.  
 
1. To everyone’s surprise, Ayatollah Khamenei stayed neutral during the election 
period and did not endorse any particular candidate or current. This convinced 
many sceptical citizens that this time the election would be conducted fairly.  
2. The televised debates helped heat up the election, created a wave of hope 
among many Iranians and inspired many undecided citizens to vote.  
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3. The principalist candidates who were supposed to be in coalition (Ghalibaf, 
Velayati, Hadad-Adel) criticised and discredited each other’s records in the 
debates. This had a negative impact on their electability and divided the 
principalists’ votes.     
4. Khatami and Rafsanjani’s public endorsements of Hassan Rouhani just a week 
before the election gave a fresh momentum to Rouhani’s campaign and 
Mohammad Reza Aref’s withdrawal in favour of Mr Rouhani increased his 
chances of winning in the first round.   
 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
Most theorists of democratisation believe that the fragmentation of elites contributes 
to the collapse of authoritarian regimes.
68
 However, scholars such as Arang 
Keshavarzian,
69
 Ronald Axtmann
70
 and Steven Levitsky
71
 have pointed out that in 
some cases, the authoritarian regimes have managed to keep the damage to a 
minimum.  
 
Some benefited from pockets of permissiveness in the international system, due 
in large part to economic or security issues that trumped democracy promotion 
on Western foreign policy agendas. Others benefited from state control over 
revenues from valuable commodities (such as oil), which undermined 
development of an autonomous civil society and gave rulers the means to co-opt 
potential opponents, and still others took advantage of quasi-traditional elite 
networks that facilitated the establishment of neopatrimonial regimes (as in 
Central Asia).
72
 
 
Keshavarzian points out that fragmentation of authority in Iran, which is the result of 
the “segmentation of the state agents”, has ironically contributed to the regime’s 
survival in spite of the serious conflicts that every now and often arise between IRI 
elites.
73
  
 
I argue that not only the sovereignty is divided but the Iranian regime is highly 
fragmented. It is this quality that enables the regime or more specifically the 
hard-liners within the regime, to reproduce its power and control the society, and 
it is because
1
 of this structure and in spite of elite fragmentation and contestation 
that the Islamic Republic has survived. I thus refer to the Islamic republic as a 
“fragmented autocracy’ which is shortened for a “fragmented state with an 
autocratic regime”.
74 
                                                 
1
 The emphasis is original. 
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For instance, the high level of elite confrontation during Khatami’s presidency did not 
bring about the downfall of the hardliners within the regime mainly because the 
reformists’ nominal legal power and authority, derived from elected bodies, was 
overridden by their rivals’ extra-legal real power coming from non-elected 
organisations. Moreover, the disarray within the reformist alliance prevented them 
from forming a coherent strategy to alter the balance of power in their favour. In 
addition, because their parties lacked a nationwide grassroots organisation, the 
reformists failed to mobilise popular support when they most needed it. Finally, 
powerful moderate conservatives such as Rafsanjani, who could have joined forces 
with Khatami to curb the hardliners’ power and influence. were alienated from the 
reformist alliance. Instead of trying to join forces with the moderate conservatives 
against the radicals, the ultra-reformists chose to settle old scores with their former 
rivals and in doing so missed a golden chance of gaining an upper hand over the 
radicals in unelected bodies.  
 
To better understand the complex Iranian polity, it is helpful to go back to the IRI’s 
constitution. The Iranian state as formed by the constitution comprises a mixture of 
contradictory institutions with overlapping authority and, as Francis Fukuyama 
describes it, “is a curious hybrid of authoritarian, theocratic and democratic 
elements.”75 For instance, although the country is officially called an Islamic 
‘Republic’, the president is only second-in-command after the Supreme Leader and 
whereas (according to the constitution) the Majlis is “the sole legislative power”,76 the 
same constitution has allowed other institutions such as the Expediency Council, the 
Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution and the Office of the Leader to put 
forward their own legislations. This situation has reinforced both the schism between 
different IRI elites and the factional system that gradually became the main 
characteristic of the Islamic Republic of Iran.   
 
However, the constitution must not be treated as the single cause of the factional 
system. In fact, in the early years of the revolution the political system was 
characterised by a form of dominant party rule which demonstrates the fact that 
factionalism was not the inevitable result of the IRI’s constitution. Moreover, the 
1989 amendments to the constitution which legalised the status of the Expediency 
Council (a non-elected parallel organisation) and thus added another layer to the 
already complex factional system, was itself an effect of the factionalism that existed 
in the Iranian state even though the factional system was also influenced (reinforced) 
by these amendments. The Iranian constitution is an important factor in understanding 
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why some options are repeatedly favoured by political actors; yet, there are other 
more compelling reasons why Iran is locked into factionalism, which will be dealt 
with in the following paragraphs.  
 
The hybrid nature of the Iranian constitution as mentioned before allows for constant 
struggles between various elite groups in the elected and appointed public and state 
bodies, such as: 
 The President’s office vs. the Supreme Leader’s office 
 The Guardian Council vs. the Majlis  
 The Majlis vs. the Expediency Council  
 The Ministry of Science vs. the Islamic Azad Universities 
 The Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance vs. the Supreme Council of the 
Cultural Revolution  
What is interesting about these authority overlaps is that despite the serious conflicts 
that persist between the above-mentioned institutions and the elites residing in them, 
so far the regime has been relatively successful in co-opting electoral loser elites into 
the system by allowing them to maintain some power through parallel organisations 
such as the Expediency Council, the Guardian Council, the Islamic Azad Universities 
and the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution. So far, this strategy has been 
efficient in containing the elite conflict within the system, thus ensuring the regime’s 
survival. When state organisations are inhabited by electoral losers, then according to 
Keshavarzian those organisations could serve as incubators for cadre building and 
safe havens for the defeated elites, allowing them to modify their previous positions 
and build new strategies for winning future elections.
77
 Keshavarzian calls these 
mostly non-elected IRI bodies, which from time to time act as a shelter/incubator for 
the electoral losers, the ‘parallel’ or ‘auxiliary’ organisations.   
 
In the Islamic Republic the production of political elites takes place within a 
diverse array of state organisations, rather than a single party or military 
hierarchy. The topography of the state, however, is such that elites differentiate 
themselves from one another and electoral losers remain active within the state. 
These auxiliary organisations allow elite conflict to persist by preventing one 
faction from completely suffocating opposing elites even if they are 
marginalised.
78
 
 
Despite the serious disagreements that sometimes emerge between elites in the 
Islamic Republic, the benefits of membership in various state organisations have so 
far prevented major elite defection. Although Mousavi and Karroubi were of course 
exceptions to this rule, the fact that other dissident IRI elite figures, such as Khatami 
and Hashemi Rafsanjani, did not follow in the footsteps of the Green Movement 
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leaders is an indication that the prospect of membership of the regime’s safe havens 
can serve as a way of containing dissent before it spreads to the public arena. Another 
example of a rogue elite figure who challenged the authority of the Supreme Leader 
but did not go the full distance towards antagonism was President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad. Although Ahmadinejad’s future is uncertain and much will depend on 
the future course of events, it is important to note that two months after the 2013 
presidential election he was appointed by the Leader as a member of the Expediency 
Council. As seen in the previous examples, when a group of IRI elites fall from favour 
they are given a chance to take refuge in one of the parallel organisations. They would 
tolerate the Leader’s arbitrary rule in return for a new lease of life and prosperity in 
the sanctuary of these auxiliary organisations. The livelihoods of the ‘loyal’ 
opposition elites are protected at the expense of their cooperation. Therefore, if they 
have to choose between their positions in these safe havens and their loyalty to a 
political party, they would most probably choose the former. This is why, historically, 
IRI elites do not resist the closure of their allied parties; IRP elites do not fight against 
the closure of their party, just as Rafsanjani did not stand firm against the dubious 
prosecution of Kargozaran director general, Mr Gholamhossein Karbaschi, and just as 
Mohammad Khatami did not resist the suppression and the dissolution of the 
Mosharekat party. All the elites involved knew that if they had strongly opposed the 
above-mentioned actions, their opposition would most likely have cost them all the 
advantages and benefits they enjoyed from their long-time attachment to the regime, 
such as lifelong impunity, membership of the Assembly of Experts (and the 
Expediency Council in the case of Rafsanjani) as well as the hope of a return to public 
office (and/or the auxiliary organisations in the case of Khatami). This could be seen 
as part of the dynamic of self-reinforcement or positive feedback processes
79
 that have 
led the anti-party, factional system in Iran to a single equilibrium. The greater the 
number of elites who choose to work within the confines of auxiliary organisations 
instead of political parties, the more the anti-party factional system is subject to 
positive feedback. With the passage of time, these elites will have less and less 
experience in how to build and run a political party and more and more on how to 
operate and flourish inside a faction. In addition, these elites would gradually be more 
inclined towards clientelistic
80
 personality politics, useful in the IRI’s factional 
system. In contrast, their organisational expertise would not increase commensurately. 
Moreover, the high cost of setting up a party would further deter these elites from 
joining or building a party while the set costs and the increasing benefits of working 
within a faction would reinforce the path of anti-party authoritarianism. 
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The path dependence of the IRI’s authoritarianism becomes clearer when considering 
some examples. The fragmented authoritarian state on one side and the weakly 
institutionalised factions on the other are reinforcing each other in a positive feedback 
loop; weakly institutionalised factions or fronts are no challenge to Khamenei’s 
authoritarian rule. Besides, a fragmented state and parallel organisations discourage 
elite defection and party building. With so much investment of time and financial 
resources (thanks to the rentier economy) in the bureaucracy of beyte rahbari (the 
office of leader), the Expediency Council, IRGC, Basij, the religious organisations 
and Friday prayers organs, IRI elites would not risk abandoning what is already 
operational and effective to go for a party system which would be expensive and time 
consuming to build and the outcome of which is not certain. 
 
A case in point is the current president, Hassan Rouhani. Following Ahmadinejad’s 
election as president in 2005, Hassan Rouhani was removed from his position as 
Iran’s top nuclear negotiator and was given a toothless position as the representative 
of the Supreme Leader to the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council. 
However, Rouhani was allowed to keep his position as the head of the Centre for 
Strategic Research (CSR) and took full advantage of the opportunities available 
through that auxiliary organisation to advance his own political ambitions. It was not 
an accident that the top ranks of Rouhani’s 2013 campaign team were his colleagues 
from the CSR. For example, Ali Younesi was deputy of the department for 
jurisprudential and legal studies in the CSR; Mahmoud Vaezi was the deputy of 
foreign policy and international relations; Akbar Turkan was the director of the 
infrastructure management studies group; and Mohammad-Bagher Nobakht was the 
deputy of the economic research department. Rouhani is yet another example of an 
elite figure choosing to operate within auxiliary organisations rather than forming or 
joining a political party.  
 
It is important to note that Ayatollah Khamenei prefers the weakly organised 
clientelistic groups or cabals such as the JMO and JPEE which have short lifespans 
(usually these fronts do not last more than one Majlis term, or four years) to well-
institutionalised political parties as it is easier for the Supreme Leader to control these 
loosely organised factions than to influence a well-established political party whose 
members are first and foremost committed to the party line. Throughout his time as 
Leader, Khamenei has systematically resisted the emergence of a party system in Iran 
and allowed parallel organisations and the factional system to flourish. In addition, to 
hold a rigorous and oppressive grip on factional affairs, he has encouraged the IRGC 
and the Basij to become more involved in factional politics. Pierson explains how the 
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allocation of political authority to particular actors (in the case of this study, Ayatollah 
Khamenei) is a key source of positive feedback.  
 
Where certain actors are in a position to impose rules on others, the employment 
of power may be self-reinforcing. Actors may utilise political authority to change 
the rules of the game (both formal institutions and various public policies) to 
enhance their power, these changes may not only shift the rules in their favour, 
but increase their own capacities for political action while diminishing those of 
their rivals. And these changes may result in adaptations that reinforce these 
trends, as undecided, weakly committed, or vulnerable actors join the winners or 
desert the losers.
81 
 
 
Finally, having mentioned the functionalist and rational choice perspectives of the 
fragmented state and factionalism in Iran, it must be noted that the purpose that these 
institutions are serving today is different from the forces behind their creation. Today, 
the IRI’s factional system may seem the most efficient in terms of keeping the 
opposition under control; however, we must not forget that at the genesis of the 
factional system, other more ‘efficient’ options (such as a single ruling party) were 
available but were ruled out because of the contingent events. The institutionalisation 
of the IRI’s factional system was not the result of an inevitable utilitarian process, nor 
the result of a single cause or function, but forged out of contingent events by the 
mechanism of positive feedback.  
 
Possible future modes of change in the factional system 
 
Many arguments about path dependency contend that radical reforms and new path 
dependencies would be shaped at critical junctures otherwise change is largely 
incremental and constrained by the past
82
 or ‘historically bounded’.83 Yet, notable 
recent contributions have emphasised alternative causal models such as ‘layering’ and 
‘conversion’ that do not involve institutional breakdown.84 Thelen identifies two such 
‘modes’ of gradual institutional change/innovation in path dependencies.  
 
One is the notion of institutional “layering” which involves the partial 
renegotiation of some elements of a given set of institutions while leaving others 
in place. The other is what we might call “conversion”, as existing institutions 
are redirected to new purposes, driving change in the role they perform and/or the 
functions they serve.
85 
 
 
With no positive signs in the horizon, ‘conversion’ seems unlikely in the case of 
Iran’s factional system. Nevertheless, one can imagine a scenario in the future where 
change in the factional system is instigated through the ‘layering’ method. Currently, 
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there are few weak, fragile and amorphous minor political parties living side by side 
with the key factions in the Iranian socio-political environment. At present there are a 
number of amorphous organisations such as Hezbe E‘temade Melli (the National Trust 
Party), Hezbe E‘tedal va Towse‘eh (the Moderation and Development Party] and the 
Islamic Motalefeh Party which operate in the Iranian political system. However, there 
was a time, not long ago, when more settled political parties such as Mosharekat 
operated in the IRI’s factional system. Thus, there are reasonable grounds rooted in 
empirical evidence from IRI history to believe that a parallel inferior system of 
political parties existing side by side with the greater system of factionalism is 
possible within the boundaries of the current system; yet, this depends very much on 
the strength and flexibility of the agency (elites) and its ability to interact with the 
powerful actors in the system.  
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